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Abstract 
This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of 
fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the 
main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. 
Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting 
procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition 
governments where parties are closely aligned, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-
making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-
year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with 
ideologically dispersed coalitions. 
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1. Introduction 
The past two decades have seen a strong and growing interest in fiscal policy rules aimed at 
containing public sector deficits and reducing public sector debts. Fiscal policy rules specify 
numerical targets for annual government deficits, debts, or spending. They have a venerable 
history at the sub-national level, and some countries have used less specific ones – such as the 
‘golden rule’ that limits annual government borrowing to investment spending - at the national 
level for a long time. What is new is the application of specific annual targets at the national 
level. The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact establish a European fiscal 
framework based on fiscal rules expressed as deficit and debt limits which national 
governments are expected to follow.  
This interest in fiscal rules is a reaction to the experience of rapidly rising debt levels and 
unsustainable deficits in the 1970s and 1980s. But while rules seem attractive and 
straightforward to contain the spending and borrowing bias of profligate governments, it is by 
no means clear what institutional design they need and how they should be embedded into the 
government budgeting process to be effective. In the EU, all member states face the same fiscal  
policy framework, but there is considerable variation in the budgeting institutions at the 
national level. This variation is due to characteristics of the political and, in particular, the 
electoral systems. In this paper, we analyse the impact of fiscal rules on the sustainability of 
public finances with a focus on the interaction between rules and budgeting processes. 
Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) show that European governments have developed two types 
of budget processes promoting fiscal discipline. Under the “delegation” approach, the budget 
process lends special agenda-setting powers in the preparation of the budget to the minister of 
finance. Under the “contract” approach, in contrast, the budget process hinges on pre-
established, numerical budgetary targets negotiated among key policy-makers. This approach 
strongly resembles the characteristics of a fiscal rule and, at a first glance, it is more compatible 
with the design of the European fiscal framework than the delegation approach. As a result, the 
European framework may be less effective in countries whose budget process is shaped by the 
delegation approach. Furthermore, Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) argue that the differences 
between these two approaches reflect countries’ basic political characteristics such as party and 
electoral systems, implying that the two are not easily interchangeable for a given country. 
Countries which typically have one-part governments or coalitions of closely aligned parties 
are more likely to adopt the delegation approach, while countries which typically have more 
dispersed coalition governments are more likely to adopt the contract approach. This suggests 
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that differences in the effectiveness of the European fiscal framework could be a permanent 
feature of the European Monetary Union and changes in this framework might be needed to 
achieve an equal degree of fiscal discipline in the EU. 
In this paper we extend the analysis in Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999). We start with a 
characterization of the budgetary institutions at the start of Stage III of EMU and their 
evolution over the past decade using a new institutional data set. We show that there is a 
correspondence between the choice of budgeting processes and national political systems in 
line with our theoretical predictions. Several states which we expect to adopt the delegation 
approach given their political systems did develop stronger budgeting institutions during the 
1990s. At the same time, countries we expect to adopt the contract approach strengthened their 
budgeting rules. Next, we explore the effect of these institutions with respect to the growth of 
public debt. As expected, delegation in budgeting procedures and more stringent fiscal rules 
both contribute to fiscal discipline. Moreover, more stringent fiscal rules work in countries 
with dispersed government coalitions, whereas delegation is effective only in states with single 
party governments or closely aligned coalitions. The punchline is that both the delegation and 
contract approaches provide effective instruments to increase fiscal discipline so long as they 
match the pre-existing government structure.  
The following section presents the theoretical background. Section 3 describes the existing 
government structures. Section 4 explains which budgeting institution determines the 
stringency of fiscal rules or targets and the degree of delegation in the budget process and how 
these institutions developed in EU member states. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence on 
the impact of budgetary institutions on public indebtedness.   
2. Fiscal governance: Types and choices 
2.1. Types of fiscal governance 
A growing body of empirical and theoretical literature suggests that the institutions governing 
the budget process are important determinants of a country’s fiscal performance (von Hagen 
1992, von Hagen and Harden, 1994; see also the international contributions in Poterba and von 
Hagen, 1999, and Strauch and von Hagen, 2000). Budgeting institutions encompass the formal 
and informal rules governing the drafting of the budget law, its passage through the legislature, 
and its implementation. These rules distribute strategic influence among the participants in the 
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budget process and regulate the flow of information. In doing so, they have important effects 
on the outcomes of budgeting processes. 
The starting point of this analysis is to recognize the externality resulting from the fact that 
government spending is commonly targeted at specific groups in society while it is financed 
from a general tax fund to which all tax-payers contribute. The incongruence between those 
who pay for, and those who benefit from, individual public policies means that individual 
spending bids tend to recognize the full benefit of additional spending but only a part of their 
additional social cost. Policymakers engage in excessive spending, since the constituencies 
they represent do not bear the full costs of these programs. In a dynamic context, the 
externality problem also results in excessive deficits and debts.1 The  tendency to spend more 
and to run large deficits increases with the number of representatives of individual spending 
interests that make autonomous spending decisions. The more representatives with policy-
making power, the greater the fragmentation of the budget process.2 
The core of this argument is that public budgeting involves a co-ordination failure among the 
relevant decision makers. The key to solving this co-ordination failure is to create institutional 
incentives that induce decision-makers to take a more comprehensive view of the budget. They 
then recognize the true marginal costs and benefits of the projects financed from the general 
tax fund, and they consequently internalize the budgeting externality.  Hallerberg and von 
Hagen (1999, see also Hallerberg, 2004) show that there are two basic institutional approaches 
to achieve that: the delegation approach and the contract approach. The delegation approach  
rests on the delegation of significant strategic powers to a decision-maker who is less bound to 
special interests than ministers heading spending departments and more prone to consider the 
budget comprehensively. In European governments, this is typically the minister of finance. 
More specifically, the delegation approach gives the finance minister strong agenda-setting 
powers over the other members of the executive during the initial budget planning stage. At the 
subsequent approval stage in parliament, the approach lends strong agenda-setting powers to 
the executive over the legislature to protect the finance minister’s budget proposal against 
significant parliamentary amendments. In the final implementation stage, the delegation 
                                                     
1  For a text book presentation of the problem see Persson and Tabellini (2000: chapters 7 and 13). Dynamic 
versions are presented in von Hagen and Harden (1994), Velasco (1999) and Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999). 
2   Since the most important representatives of individual spending interests in European governments are the 
individual spending ministers, an implication of this proposition is that government spending and deficits grow 
with the number of spending departments and ministers in a country’s government. Kontopoulos and Perotti 
(1999) and Volkerink and de Haan (2001) confirm this proposition empirically for OECD countries, although 
results vary across sample periods. 
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approach vests the finance minister with strong monitoring capacities in the implementation of 
the budget and the power to correct any deviations from the budget plan.  
The contract approach, in contrast, rests on an agreement among the relevant parties at the start 
of the budgeting process. Such agreements provide a medium-term orientation for fiscal policy 
and include numerical targets for specific budget items. This contractual institutionalisation of 
fiscal targets resembles elements of fiscal rules. Here, it is bargaining among policy makers 
that encourages a comprehensive view of the budget and leads to centralization of the process 
(von Hagen and Harden, 1994). In contrast to his role under delegation, the minister of finance 
in this case monitors and enforces the fiscal contract but has little power at the planning stage 
of the budget. At the approval stage in parliament, the legislature has strong information rights, 
which enable it to monitor the executive’s compliance with the budgetary targets and the 
performance of individual ministries. At the implementation stage, the contract approach 
resembles the delegation approach. It vests the finance minister with strong monitoring 
capacities regarding the execution of the budget and the power to correct deviations from it. 
2.2. Political determinants of the type of fiscal governance 
The existence of two institutional approaches, delegation and contracts, raises the question 
which one is more appropriate to address the externality problem of the budget process in a 
given country. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999) argue that each approach is suitable for a 
particular type of government. Delegation is the proper approach for single-party governments 
or governments where coalition partners are closely aligned to one another and run together in 
elections. In such places, the ideological distance among the political parties is low. The 
contract approach is better suited for multi-party coalition governments where the ideological 
distance among parties is high.  
A first reason for why ideological distance matters is that it is difficult for a multi-party 
coalition government to work under a strong finance minister. Such a minister necessarily 
comes from one of the coalition parties, and vesting him with special authorities raises 
concerns among the other parties about a fair treatment of their spending preferences in the 
budget process. These concerns are likely to increase with increasing ideological dispersion of 
the government and increasing competition in the process of coalition formation. Furthermore, 
enforcement of the finance minister’s budget proposal under the delegation approach 
ultimately depends on the ability of the head of the executive to remove recalcitrant spending 
ministers from office. This power may exist in single-party governments, where the hierarchy 
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in cabinet conforms to the hierarchy of party power structures. It may also exist in coalitions of 
closely aligned partners that cannot continue in power without each other, such as the 
coalitions common in Germany and France and, for an extended period of time, in Austria. But 
this power does not usually exist in multi-party coalition governments where alternative 
coalitions are possible and the right to nominate candidates for (and remove them from) 
specific posts belongs to individual coalition parties.  
A second reason is that it is harder for single-party governments to commit to fiscal targets, 
since there is no effective threat against reneging on them and the executive can simply walk 
away from targets deemed no longer convenient. In contrast, as long as there are alternative 
possible coalition partners in the opposition, the threat to break up the coalition is an effective 
one for enforcing budget targets in ideologically dispersed multi-party governments. The risk 
of such a step increases for those cases where a break-up in the government leads to a general 
election. Furthermore, multi-party coalition governments have a stronger incentive to negotiate 
multi-annual fiscal targets or rules at the start of a government to avoid having to renegotiate 
the fiscal policy stance annually, which may be politically costly if the ideological constellation 
within the government is rather complex. Continued budgetary struggles distract from the 
operational functions of the government and may hamper the effective implementation of 
policies.  
While the preceding discussion refers to majority governments only, it can be easily 
generalized to minority governments. The question to ask is, what is the ideological distance 
among parties needed to pass the annual budget? In practice, the distance is generally large, 
and this suggests the use of fiscal contracts to provide the needed centralization of the budget 
process.  
3. Electoral systems and party constellations in government in European countries 
Party constellations in parliament and government that affect the choice of fiscal governance 
are, in turn, closely linked to the electoral system. One important feature of electoral systems is 
the number of parties that win seats in parliament. If there are few parties, there is a higher 
chance that one party can win an absolute majority, and an absolute majority is a virtual 
certainty in two-party systems. Several studies indicate that the number of parties in a given 
system is strongly and positively correlated with the number of representatives elected from 
each electoral district, known as district magnitude (Duverger 1954, Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 1993). Electoral systems with low district magnitudes distribute seats less proportionally 
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than those with large district magnitudes, and lower proportionality usually favours larger 
parties. Plurality systems, which elect only one representative per district, encourage two-party 
systems, and they are consequently most likely to have one-party majority governments. 
Proportional representation (PR) electoral systems have more variation in their district 
magnitudes, though the magnitudes are always larger than those found in plurality systems. PR 
systems tend to result in more parties in parliament and multiparty majority or either one-party 
or multi-party minority governments. Other factors that affect the number of parties 
represented in parliament include minimum-vote thresholds requiring to gain a certain 
percentage of the national vote for a party to win any legislative seats, the method used to 
apportion seats, and whether or not a second allocation of seats is used to reduce disparities at 
the district level. 
Table 1 compares the electoral systems and types of governments in EU member states. The 
first column describes the key characteristics of the electoral system, and the second column 
the district magnitude. The following columns present indicators for the dispersion of 
preferences and the competitiveness of the government formation stage for period 1980 to 
2000. The first is the average number of parties in government. The figures show that there is a 
strong, but not perfect, correlation between the district magnitude and the number of parties a 
suggested by the theory. Plurality systems and proportional systems with low district 
magnitudes tend to lead to one-party governments. As district magnitude increases, the 
relationship between district magnitude and the number of parties in government is more 
tenuous for European countries. Other factors, such as traditional party structures or the main 
political cleavages in the party system, become more important.  Belgium and Italy (before 
1996) have the maximum average number of parties in government in our sample with 4.5 and 
4.2, respectively. 
Our second indicator, the change in coalition of ruling parties as a share of the total number of 
new governments, is an indicator of the competitiveness of the electoral and government 
formation process. There are different reasons for the termination of governments, elections 
being the most important one. However, the government formation process may not be very 
competitive if there are clearly established party blocks and parties continue in power for 
decades. Conversely, coalition governments may frequently reshuffle and the government 
formation process may be relatively uncertain ex-ante. The data indicate that there is not a 
perfect relationship between the number of parties in government and the competitiveness of 
the government formation process. For example, Belgium has a large number of parties in 
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government and a relatively competitive process. By comparison, governing coalitions in Italy 
are large, but also fairly stable during the 1980s to the mid-1990s. In Ireland, there are a small 
number of parties in government, but these change rather frequently after the end of a term or 
the breakdown of a coalition. The fifth column then shows the ideological range of a governing 
coalition. This and the previous indicators are taken from Tsebelis’ dataset on veto players.3 
The ideological indicator captures the classic left-right dimension.  
The final column then indicates which type of fiscal governance we would expect to be most 
adequate to achieve fiscal discipline based on these characteristics and the prevalence of 
minority governments in member states. Recall that our argument is that countries with low 
ideological distance among parties needed to pass the budget should be appropriate for 
delegation-type fiscal procedures while countries with high ideological distance should be 
places for rules in the form of contracts. The average score is helpful in categorizing some 
cases—the United Kindgom has an average of 0, indicating only one-party majority 
governments—but averages for others can be deceiving. A country with high ideological 
distance in the first half of the period but zero in the second half would have an ambiguous 
ideological score, but should be coded as being appropriate for contracts in the first half and 
delegation in the second half.  
To follow the patterns of ideological distance over time, Graph 1 presents the scores by country 
over the twenty-year period, and we use this information to make predictions about the 
appropriate form of fiscal governance. One observes three sets of cases based on the relative 
stability of the scores. Following closely the aggregate results, the first category are those with 
stable ideological distance. One set of countries have zero or almost zero the entire time 
(Germany and the United Kingdom) or with distance usually at zero with a short interruption 
(Greece and Spain).4 France is a somewhat tougher call; it has a low average score but also 
periods where the scores are notably above zero. Given the emergence of two clear ideological 
blocks that face one another in elections, however, France belongs in the same category. 
Similarly, other countries have stable distances that generally score around .2 or above that 
remain above this threshold or that bounce only once below it (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands).5 These are all “high” ideological distance states. The second group 
                                                     
3  See Table A1 in the appendix for details. 
 
4 Note that Greece actually has a short-lived conservative-communist coalition that appears in the Graph, but, 
because we exclude Greece 1989-93 because of data availability problems, Greece has a score of 0 during the 
time period covered in the analysis.  
5  The mean and median of the ideological distance variable in our data set is 0.19. 
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are countries seem to predict one type of governance in a given, defined period but another 
type of governance in the remaining period. Italy has a clear break from 1996 on, with a 
distance at zero, while it has a fairly large ideological spread in the first period. The country is 
therefore coded a low ideological distance country from 1997 onwards. Similarly, Portugal 
begins the period with a score near zero, but the score increases in the mid-1990s. It has again 
dropped to zero after the 2005 elections (not shown on this particular graph). Given that one of 
the reasons for the higher score was a minority government that missed majority status by just 
one vote, it seems reasonable the country continue to be coded low for the entire period. 
Austria has a high distance through 2000, then a low distance. It is coded accordingly. The 
final set of countries has scores that bounce around.  Ireland move down and up and down, 
with some stability at the end. It has a high score through 1997 and a low score thereafter. 
Correspondingly, it is coded a low distance state from 1998 onwards. For Sweden, the only 
period with the distance at zero is at the very beginning. It is therefore considered a high 
distance state. Once these scores are computed, they suggest clear predictions about the most 
effective form of fiscal governance over the entire period—delegation-type fiscal rules are 
most appropriate for low score states while contract-type fiscal rules are most appropriate for 
high score states.  
4. Delegation in the budgeting process and the stringency of fiscal rules – concepts, 
data and method 
4.1. Methodology and data 
In this section, we operationalise and describe the two elements contributing to the 
centralisation of budgetary institutions. The first is the degree of delegation in budgetary 
procedures prevailing in the EU member states, while the second is the stringency of fiscal 
rules, which captures the medium-term oriented budgetary targets characterising the contracts 
approach. Table 2 lists several institutional features that capture the degree of delegation in the 
budget process. Delegation in the budget formulation stage is stronger the more encompassing 
the budgetary constraint set at the beginning of the process, the more agenda-setting power is 
given to the minister of finance in the budgetary planning, the broader the scope of the budget 
norms the minister can set for budget negotiations, and the more centralised the structure of 
negotiations. The budget negotiations in parliament are the more constrained the less scope is 
given to amendments, the higher the costs of a failure to pass the budget imposing discipline on 
legislators, and the less room for log-rolling is given by the voting procedure. The degree of 
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flexibility or control during the budget execution is determined by the authority of the minister 
of finance to block expenditures, the existence of cash limits, the need for an disbursement 
approval from the minister of finance or a controller, the scope of budgetary transfers, the 
institutional barriers to changes of the budget law during the implementation phase and the 
strictness of carry-over regulations. 
Fiscal rules can range from mere declarations of intent to legal multi-annual budget plans 
containing detailed expenditure targets. They are the more stringent, the more encompassing 
the budget category or aggregate for which a target is set, the longer the time horizon to which 
the target applies, the more elaborate the forecasting procedure on which they build and the 
higher the degree of political commitment attached to them. 
One or more of us collected data on these fiscal institutions in EU member states in three 
rounds of expert surveys conducted in 1991, 2001 and 2004.6 The detailed results of the earlier 
surveys are published in von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg et al. (2001). The surveys in 2001 
and 2004 were deliberately designed to provide an update of the earlier information and to 
explore the characteristics of additional institutional items in EU member states. We sent the 
surveys to several experts in each country belonging to the ministry of finance, the parliament 
and the central bank. We complemented these data with documentary analysis and in-depth 
interviews in member country seats of government.7 Based on these sources, we have 
comparative evidence on the 19 institutional items specified in Table 2 from 1985 onwards. 
To make the data usable for quantitative analysis, we operationalise and code fiscal rules 
according to their stringency and also budgetary processes according to the degree of 
delegation. Each institutional item ranges from 0 to 4.8 The coding scheme and the scores of 
individual institutions are provided in earlier publications and a web annex to this paper.  
Since our theory predicts that individual institutions of the budgeting process interact and that 
their choice is not random across countries, we aggregate the individual scores to an index of 
delegation inherent in the budgeting process and an index for the stringency of fiscal rules. For 
this purpose, we use the simple average of scores belonging to the multi-annual targets (see 
Table 2), rescaled to a range between 0 and 1, as our rules index. For the degree of delegation 
in the budget process, we normalise the aggregate sum of institutional items characterising the 
                                                     
6  In between a survey was conducted by de Haan et al. (1999) 
7  For the 2001 survey, interviews were done in all seats of government of EU member states except Vienna, for 
which indications were already complete. 
8 In many cases, there were five possible answers, so the answers were coded on a 0 to 4 scale, with higher 
numbers representing more centralisation of the budget process. 
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different stages (budget negotiations (BN), budget approval (BA) and budget implementation 
(BI)) and then add up the indices of the three stages using equal weights w of 1/12 to an 
aggregate score: 
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Thus the aggregate index again ranges from 0 to 1. Adding up institutional items assumes that 
the individual institutional elements are substitutes. In contrast, a multiplicative combination of 
the items would capture a complementary relationship. The ranking of aggregate institutional 
indices is rather robust to variations in the weighting of institutional scores or the aggregation 
mode9, which allows us to conduct our analysis with a single delegation index for the 
budgetary procedures. The stringency index for fiscal rules is the simple average of the 
individual scores of the respective institutions.  
4.2. Institutional changes in the 1990s 
Between 1991 and 2004, there have been a number of changes in budgetary procedures that led 
to an overall strengthening of budgetary institutions. At an aggregate level, this finding is 
reflected in Graph 2, which presents the average institutional scores for the stringency of fiscal 
rules and the degree of delegation of the different stages and the entire budget process by 
groups of countries with high or low ideological distance government before and after major 
reform efforts.10 
The changes over the past 14 years have been fairly sizeable for two classes of fiscal rules or 
multi-annual targets. EU member states now uniformly report the usage of such targets. This 
practice varied in the early 1990s. Moreover, large improvements occurred regarding the nature 
of the budget plan. While several plans were previously based on ad-hoc assumptions, they are 
now more often reported to be based on a consistent macro-economic framework. Beyond this, 
the degree of commitment has improved in some countries, but above all Denmark and 
Sweden. The level of commitment in states using external contracts seems therefore to be 
equivalent to those where an internal contract system, e.g. being based on a coalition 
agreement, would be suitable. In line with our predictions, the existing rules in states with 
                                                     
9  This has been confirmed in previous research on various country groups (see Alesina et al. 1995, Gleich 2003, 
and Strauch 1998). In particular, the results remain robust when the index is multiplicative instead of additive 
and different elasticities of substitution are attached to items within sub-indices or between sub-indices. 
10  After the major reform steps captured in Graph 2 only minor modifications to budgetary institutions took 
place. For details see the Annex on the institutional codings. 
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ideologically less dispersed governments are slightly less stringent than those in states with 
ideologically highly dispersed governments after major reform steps were taken. 
Underlying the marked strengthening of aggregate scores for the executive planning stage are 
two developments. The general constraint and the type of norm given for budgetary requests 
have tightened across the board. Other institutions have developed more selectively. In 
particular, the agenda setting power of the minister of finance and the structure of cabinet 
negotiations provide the minister of finance with more authority today. These reforms have 
above all transformed the fragmented structures in Greece, Italy and Spain towards a 
delegation model, as one would expect given their low ideological distance. To a lesser extent 
they have also helped to overcome the institutional weakness in some states with high 
ideological distance, such as Belgium and Ireland before 1998. 
Graph 2 indicates that the position of the government vis-à-vis parliament has strengthened, but 
that overall institutional changes have been less pronounced than for fiscal rules and the first 
stage of the budget process. Nevertheless, changes have been particularly strong in states with 
low ideological distance, where it may be much easier now for the minister of finance to 
channel budgetary proposals through parliament than before. The most notable change 
concerned offsetting amendments - a majority of states introduced this requirement. Additional 
restraints on amendments have tightened the budgetary process in Germany, Greece and Italy, 
i.e. states with low ideological distance. Institutional changes are equally apparent, but 
somewhat more balanced across types of government when examining the global vote on the 
total budget—eight states introduced this requirement after 1991. Overall, countries with rather 
fragmented parliamentary institutions, such as Greece, Germany, Italy, and Sweden have 
introduced major changes to increase the degree of delegation in the process. 
Institutional change to the implementation stage of the budget process have been more mixed 
compared to other stages. The right to block expenditures has been mainly strengthened among 
states with regular minority governments. Cash limits and disbursement approval have gained 
more prevalence in states with low ideological dispersion in government. Regulations on 
transfers have been reported for six countries. Carry-over regulations are tighter in Germany 
and Spain now than a decade ago. Almost surprisingly, regulations on budgetary changes 
apparently are less stringent in several EU member states now, with five of fifteen allowing 
changes mid-year that did not allow them before. Regarding cross sectional performance, most 
institutional changes are again reported for Italy, but there is no clear pattern apparent beyond 
that. 
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Overall, the stringency of budget rules has increased and the fragmentation of budgetary 
procedures diminished. The main development that can be detected for EU member states in 
this respect is that several countries, which previously had rather fragmented budgetary 
processes, now have raised the degree of delegation inherent in the budget process. This is the 
direction of institutional reform that our analytical framework would suggest regarding the 
appropriate form of governance in these countries. 
Against this general development, there are still remaining differences across groups of 
countries in 2004. Countries where a delegation approach may be functional have on average 
less stringent fiscal rules and targets, a higher degree of delegation in budget negotiations 
during the planning stage and a more restrictive amendment and voting process in parliament 
than countries where a contract approach would be more functional. However, these 
differences emerge often from differences in specific institutional items rather than across the 
board in all items.  
5. The impact of types of fiscal governance and fiscal rules on public debt 
We now turn to the question whether the institutions described above also differ in their impact 
on fiscal discipline. The next section presents the econometric specification of the model and 
derives the key hypotheses. Section V.2 presents the empirical results.  
5.1. Econometric model 
To analyse the impact of budgetary institutions on deficits and debt, we estimate the following 
model which has been used in several other studies (see e.g. Roubini and Sachs 1989, de Haan 
and Sturm 1994, Hallerberg and von Hagen 1999): 
 
tititititititi ISPXdebtdebt ,,4,3,2,11,, εβββββα +++++Δ+=Δ −    (1) 
 
The dependent variable is the change in general government gross public debt as share of GDP 
for country i at time t, t=(1,…,T). There are four reasons for using general instead of central 
government debt. First, as indicated above, it makes the results of our analysis comparable to 
important studies in the literature. Second, general government public debt is the relevant 
concept for the European fiscal framework. General government debt, rather than central 
government debt, has been used in the European context since it was more comparable across 
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countries before budgetary statistics were largely harmonized under ESA95.11 Third, it is the 
economically more relevant concept when thinking about long-term fiscal sustainability. 
Finally, using general government debt allows us to capture potential substitution effects across 
government levels, which may be the outcome of budgetary decisions at the central 
government level, but would be lost if one focuses only on central government debt. For 
example, Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) show that fiscal rules induce US state governments to 
shift fiscal imbalances to the local level. Note that, with the exception of states in Germany, 
sub-national governments in Europe generally incur low levels of debt. Thus, the difference 
between central and general government debt is largely unaffected by budgetary decisions of 
lower-level governments in most European countries. In Germany, budgetary institutions at the 
state level are very similar to those at the federal level.    
In the empirical model, we include several macro-economic variables in matrix X={real GDP 
growth, change in unemployment rate, lagged debt level and debt service costs}. Real GDP 
growth and changes in the unemployment rate should affect changes in government debt 
through automatic stabilisers and discretionary measures aiming at economic stabilisation. The 
lagged debt level provides a proxy for the inter-temporal budget constraint or long-term 
sustainability to which the budgetary balance has to react. Debt servicing costs capture the 
impact of interest payments as well as political pressures that might emerge from high levels of 
interest payments on governments. The lagged change in the debt level addresses the serial 
correlation of the time series. The matrix P comprises two political controls, P={election year, 
veto}. The veto variable is taken from Tsebelis’ concept of veto-players and captures the 
ideological dispersion of parties required to pass the budget. It measures the maximum 
ideological distance among those parties based on ideological scores along an economic, left-
right dimension (see Table 1 for further explanation). Previous studies (e.g., Roubini and Sachs 
1989, Spolaore 1993) have argued that coalition governments find it more difficult to agree on 
consolidation efforts than one party-governments and included the number of parties in 
government as an explanatory variable.12 In contrast, Tsebelis (2002) points out that the 
difficulty to reach an agreement depends on how closely aligned the coalition partners are in 
their views on important political issues. Closely aligned partners should find it easier to reach 
an agreement than parties with deep ideological differences on many issues. Veto player 
distance is therefore a more nuanced way of considering the number of parties. 
                                                     
11 In particular, Germany reported its Länder figures under “Central Government” under the ESA 1979 
framework (Savage 2005, 72). 
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The matrix S={population, openness, output volatility} comprises some variables describing 
structural characteristics of the countries under consideration that may be related to budgetary 
performance. Population is taken as a measure for the size of the economy. Generally, the size 
of a country can affect the economies of scale in the production of public services. Larger 
populations may therefore be associated with lower spending, and possibly lower deficit levels. 
Openness is related to the exposure of economic sectors to external competitiveness. This 
exposure, and the associated need for sectoral adjustments, according to Katzenstein (1985), 
lead to more consensus-oriented, corporatist structures in Europe, ensuring policy support to 
the adjustment process and, if necessary, compensatory measures, which might have negative 
effects on the budgetary balance. Output volatility is obviously related to the openness of the 
economy. However, it should capture more generally the demand for fiscal insurance (see also 
Rodrik 1998). Since insurance may be provided by the automatic stabilisation of disposable 
income, there is no obvious deficit bias over the cycle. This could nevertheless lead to a deficit 
bias if the policy reaction to economic fluctuations is asymmetric, or tax and benefit systems 
lead to a ratcheting upward of unemployment rates. 
The matrix I = {fiscal convergence, borrowing restraints for lower level of government, 
delegation index, rules index} represents the institutional variables. The convergence indicator 
is based on the distance to the reference value for the deficit-to-GDP ratio of 3% from the 
Maastricht Treaty and captures the need for adjustment for those countries with larger deficits 
between 1992 and 1997. The second institutional variable is a dummy variable, which is one 
for countries where borrowing restrains are imposed on regional or local governments.13 The 
third and the fourth institutional variables are the delegation and the fiscal rules index 
explained above. 
We summarize our discussion so far in the following two hypotheses for the empirical analysis: 
H1: More delegation in the budget process contributes to lower growth of public debt in states 
with low ideological distance but not in states with high ideological distance. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
12  A notable exception is Volkerink and de Haan (2001) who use different measures for the ideological 
complexion of government. 
13 The information is taken from Eichengreen and von Hagen (1995) and Hallerberg et al. (2001). To assess the 
impact of fiscal federalism on debt dynamics at the national level, we also considered standard measures of 
fiscal decentralization, such as central government own revenues as a share of general government revenues, 
as explanatory variables. However, data for different layers of government are not consolidated, raising 
conceptual problems. They are also not available for all countries over the entire sample period. Given the 
limited size of our sample, we dropped these variables to avoid further missing observations. We thank 
Gerhard Schwab for the data screening. 
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H2: More stringent fiscal rules reduce growth of public debt in states with high ideological but 
not in states with low ideological distance. 
The thrust of the analysis is variation finding, i.e., a comparison of the effects of institutions 
between two groups of countries. This contrasts with other empirical studies (de Haan et al. 
1999, von Hagen and Harden 1994, Kontopolous and Perotti 1999, Arreaza et al. 1999) that 
consider a universal impact of budgeting institutions across all EU-15 member states. One can 
pursue two different econometric approaches for this exercise. One is to combine the 
delegation index and the fiscal rules index with categorical dummy variables for the type of 
country and estimate the model for all countries simultaneously. The other is to split the sample 
into two parts, one for delegation states and one for contract states. The first approach has been 
used by Hallerberg et al. (2001). Here, we opt for the alternative one, since we have a larger 
number of observations and this approach does not restrict the coefficients on the other 
variables to be the same for both groups of countries.  
Our sample starts in 1985 and ends in 2004 and has a total of 296 observations due to missing 
data on debt-servicing costs in Greece during 1989-1992. Using the information provided in 
questionnaires and further documentary analysis (see Hallerberg 2004) changes in institutional 
rules during the sample period were coded for the years in which major reforms took place.14 
For the estimation of this model, two further issues have to be taken into account: 
heterogeneity and endogeneity. The nature of our data, in particular the institutional variables 
which show little time variation, does not allow us to use common panel data estimators with 
fixed or random effects to capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity. As explained in more 
detail in the annex to this paper, a dynamic panel estimate of equation (1) requires a 
transformation of variables, which would dramatically reduce the number of non-zero 
observations for budgetary institutions and lead to unreliable estimates. Therefore, we use an 
OLS estimate and include more than the usual set of structural variables in this context. A 
relatively large set of structural variables, which often have more between than within group 
variation, contributes to the consistency of the estimates since these variables capture potential 
heterogeneity across groups. Furthermore, doing so helps to minimize the risk of an omitted 
variables bias. To compute the standard errors of the estimates, we account for groupwise 
                                                     
14 In particular, the main change in the index occurs as of 1993 for Belgium, Ireland; 1994 for Spain, 1995 for the 
Netherlands; 1996 for Finland, 1997 for Italy, Sweden; and 1998 for  Austria, Denmark, France, Great Britain, 
Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. 
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heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation  across countries of the error terms with 
panel-corrected standard errors.15 
Regarding the endogeneity problem, one might question the validity of the above specification 
to estimate equation (1) due to the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous macro-variables. 
Output growth, the unemployment rate, and the interest rate may be affected by 
contemporaneous fiscal shocks. A further objection may be raised regarding the validity of our 
institutional measures. Changes in budgeting institutions may be endogenous components of  
fiscal adjustment strategies to comply with the Maastricht criteria.16 If they are, the OLS 
estimates would be biased. To tackle this issue, we conduct a Hausmann specification test for 
endogeneity of the macro-economic and institutional variables (see Wooldridge 2002). For the 
macroeconomic variables, we also checked for an impact of lagged variables in levels and first 
differences in the first stage regression.17 Since our sample includes annual data, we use a 
maximum of two lags. Then we added further variables to the model, i.e, the output gap, long-
term interest rates, and the contemporaneous US real GDP growth rate, the change in the US 
unemployment rate and the US real long-term interest rate.18 These variables were kept in the 
model when they increase the overall explanatory power of the first stage regression model.  
To control for the endogeneity of budgetary institutions, we instrumentalised the change in the 
delegation and rules index using the institutional setting and the debt level in 1991. The debt 
level in 1991 captures the need for fiscal restraint over the coming years in order to maintain or 
achieve fiscal sustainability. It should therefore be correlated with the institutional reform 
efforts made later on, but since it precedes the convergence process starting in 1992, it is 
uncorrelated with the structural error term. The results of the tests are presented in Table 3, 
which suggests that endogeneity is not to be a problem in our case. 
                                                     
15 The command is xtpcse in Stata 9.2. 
16  An important question to consider is why countries change their budget institutions. The answer is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but there is work that considers this question. In a book-length treatment that traces 
changes in budget institutions in the EU-15, Hallerberg (2004) contends that two preconditions are needed for 
the appropriate institutions to be put in place. First, the party system must be competitive so that voters can 
punish incumbents who do not maintain fiscal discipline. Second, the party system must be stable so that 
budget rules have time to become institutionalized.  Hallerberg (ibidem) concludes that Maastricht may have 
helped focus decision-makers on maintaining fiscal discipline in some countries like Belgium and Italy, but it 
was the institutionalisation of certain forms of fiscal governance (Belgium contracts, Italy delegation)  that 
mattered the most. 
17  This is to reflect the different approaches to instrumentalising variables in dynamic panel models using GMM 
estimators (see Baltagi 2005). 
18  See e.g Gali and Perotti (2003) who also use US GDP data for this purpose. The role of the US long-term bond 
yields for financial conditions in Europe is well-documented (see Favero et al. 1997, Cordogno, Missale and 
Favero 2004). 
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5.2. Empirical results 
The estimation results of our model for the entire sample of countries are presented in Table 4. 
First, the baseline model including economic controls and political factors explains roughly 
60% of the variance. This is quite satisfactory. Several of the macroeconomic variables have 
the expected effects on changes in public debt. Real GDP growth has a negative impact, while 
changes in unemployment produce a strong rise in public debt. The lagged debt level has a 
small negative coefficient suggesting that countries raise their budget balances in response to 
past fiscal deficits. This reaction implies that these countries in theory respect their inter-
temporal budget constraints, although the coefficient seems rather small.  
Regarding the political variables, we find empirical evidence for an electoral cycle, indicating 
that public debt tends to increase more in election years. Smaller ideological differences among 
the parties forming a coalition reduce the growth of public debt. Adding the structural factors 
to this model does not lead to any additional explanatory power. All three structural variables – 
population, openness and volatility – remain insignificant.19 When the set of institutional 
variables is added, the overall explanatory power of the model increases, albeit slightly. The 
delegation index carries a negative coefficient, which is statistically significant only at the 10% 
level. The rules index misses even that standard, albeit by a very small margin (p=0.109) 
Table 5 contains the estimates of separate regressions for states with low and high ideological 
distance respectively. The overall explanatory power of the model for the group with high 
ideological distance is considerably larger than for states with ideologically well-aligned 
governments and all countries taken together. Political business cycles are significant only for 
low ideological distance states, where debt growth on average is about 2 percentage points 
higher during election years, according to our coefficient estimate. The fact that the electoral 
cycle plays a stronger role in such states makes intuitive sense and is compatible with findings 
by Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998) and Clark and Hallerberg (2000). Coalition governments 
in competitive party systems probably find it harder to agree on a fiscal expansion during 
election years, since it may not benefit all parties equally. For one-party governments, such 
distributional aspects do not arise. Fiscal restraints on lower levels of government only matter 
for the group of high ideological distance states. This result seems to be mainly driven by the 
Northern countries, which generally have minority governments. Specifically, Denmark and 
                                                     
19 As discussed above, we keep these variables in the model to capture cross-sectional variance that should not be 
ascribed to the institutional indices. 
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Sweden have borrowing restraints on local governments and had fairly low budget deficits or 
even surpluses at least from the mid-1990s onwards.20 
For the group of high ideological distance states, the delegation index has a positive 
coefficient, which, however, is not statistically significant at standard levels. In contrast, the 
fiscal rules index has a statistically significant, negative effect on the growth of public debt. 
This suggests that tightening fiscal rules in high ideological distance states leads to a decline in 
the growth rate of public debt. Our result also suggests that the strengthening of multi-annual 
budget plans in such states during the 1990s has a long-run pay-off in terms of lower public 
deficits and debt.  
For the group of low ideological distance states, the delegation index has a significant and 
negative coefficient. This shows that strengthening elements of delegation in the budgeting 
process has a negative long-run effect on public debt and deficits in this group of countries. 
Thus, the reforms of the budget processes strengthening delegation in these countries during 
the 1990s should have a long-run benefit in terms of higher fiscal discipline.21 The fiscal rules 
index, in contrast, has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant only at the p=.1 
level for this group of countries. Thus, tightening fiscal rules is, at best, an inefficient way to 
tighten fiscal discipline in low ideological distance states. In neither of the regressions is the 
fiscal convergence variable statistically significant, which suggests that there was not a direct 
“Maastricht effect.” In sum, our empirical results are consistent with the two hypotheses 
postulated above. 
6. Summary 
 
In this study we have updated and extended previous research on budgeting processes in 
European countries. Using a unique data set we have described the current structure of 
budgetary processes and the development of a selected set of institutions over the last ten years. 
The main finding is that budgetary processes generally are more centralised now than they 
were in the early 1990s, when several countries still showed rather fragmented decision-
making structures giving rise to a budgetary co-ordination problem. As a result, spending and 
deficit biases should be less prevalent in budgetary decision-making now than they were a 
                                                     
20  This result also overturns the counterintuitive finding for the reduced sample on which Hallerberg et al. (2004) 
was based. 
21  In contrast to Hallerberg et al. (2004), we find no statistically significant impact of fiscal rules in delegation 
states due to the larger sample period. 
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decade ago in several highly indebted European countries. Furthermore, institutional reforms in 
several countries were in line with our functional considerations relating the structure of 
government to the type of fiscal governance, and there remain clear differences in the pattern 
of budgetary institutions between low and high ideological distance states. The differences are 
small when we look at aggregate indices of budgetary institutions, but they can be large when 
we consider individual delegation and fiscal rules items.   
The budgetary impact of these forms of governance has been the main topic of our paper. We 
find that delegating budgetary decision-making to the minister of finance effectively improves 
fiscal discipline where the ideological dispersion of government is nil or sufficiently small, i.e., 
countries which typically have one-party governments or coalition governments formed by 
closely aligned parties over most of the sample period. The opposite is true for the stringency 
of fiscal rules, which are effective in states with a considerable degree of ideological dispersion 
in government. These results confirm that the choice of institutions to strengthen fiscal 
discipline and their impact depends critically on the type of government and, hence, the 
political environment and constitutional characteristics such as the electoral system.  
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Annex – Tables and Graphs 
Table 1: Electoral System, Government Constellation and Type of Fiscal Governance, 1980-2000  
 Electoral System District 
Magnitude 
Average No of 
Parties 
Change in 
Coalition or 
Ruling Party 
Mean 
Ideological 
Range  
Ideological 
Range Low or 
High 
  
Austria 2-tier PR; 
remainder 
transfer 
20/91 1.9 37.5 0.26 H 84-99, L 00-   
Belgium PR 23 4.5 63.6 0.36 H   
Denmark 2-tier PR; 
adjustment seats 
7/175 2.5 60.0 0.34 H   
Finland PR 13 3.9 66.7 0.41 H   
France Plurality 1 1.6 53.8 0.11 L   
Germany 2-tier PR, 
adjustment seats 
1/603 1.9 30.0 0.04 L   
United 
Kingdom 
Plurality 1 1.0 20.0 0.00 L   
Greece reinforced PR 6 1.0 42.8 0.02 L   
Ireland STV 4 1.8 77.8 0.20 H 85-97, L 98-   
Italy 2-tier PR; 
remainder 
transfer 
19/625 4.2 23.5 0.13 H 85-96, L 97-   
Luxembourg PR 14 2.0 40.0 0.20 H   
Netherlands PR 150 2.4 71.4 0.30 H   
Portugal PR 12 1.7 18.2 0.14 L   
Spain PR 6 1.0 28.6 0.07 L   
Sweden 2-tier PR 11/350 1.5 40.0 0.22 H   
Note:  Data for electoral systems and district magnitude are taken from Hallerberg and von Hagen (1999). The data were updated where necessary. Other data are own 
calculations based on data provided by Georges Tsebelis (see Table A1 for details). A two-tiered electoral system is one where an upper level of seats is used to fill in 
the results at a lower level to make the overall distribution of seats more proportional; in Denmark, for example, there are seven seats per electoral district on average but 
there are 175 seats used to fill in the results so that the proportion of seats a party wins matches more closely the proportion of votes it receives. In all 2 tier systems, the 
district magnitude lists first the number of seats per district at the lower level then the number of seats in the upper level. The average number of parties in government 
and changes in the coalition or ruling party include data until 1995 for Italy and exclude three short-term caretaker governments in Greece (1989-90). The mean 
ideological range is computed for the years 1985 to 2004 to match the years in the empirical results below.  They are calculated according to Tsebelis (2002) and 
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normalized to be on a scale between 0 and 1. A score of 0 means that there are no ideological differences among the party(ies) in government. Abbreviations in the last 
column indicate whether the ideological scores are considered Low or High based on the average ideological range and on the overall pattern displayed in Graph 1.  
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Graph 1: Ideological Distances among Parties Needed to Pass Budget Legislation 
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Source: Own computation based on http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/ and updated through 2004. The y axis 
has values for the standardised veto player distance, which range theoretically from 0 to 1. 
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Table 2: Institutional Items 
Budgetary Process 
Executive Planning  Legislative Approval Implementation 
- general constraint 
- agenda setting of minister 
of finance 
- budget norms (broad or for 
specific spending items) 
- structure of negotiations in 
cabinet 
- amendment limitations 
- amendment off-setting 
- budget amendment can lead 
to  fall of government 
- all expenditures passed in 
one vote 
- global vote on budget (vote 
on total size of budget) 
- minister of finance can 
block expenditures 
- cash limits 
- constraints on transfer 
allowance 
- changes in budget law 
- disbursement approval 
- carry-over regulations  
Fiscal Targets 
- type of multiannual target 
(revenues, spending, 
deficits) 
- horizon 
- nature of plan (quality and 
regularity of planning 
exercise) 
- degree of commitment 
(legal, political or 
indicative) 
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Graph 2: Pattern of Institutional Change in EU Member States Before and After Major 
Institutional Reforms 
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Note: For institutional items included see Table 2. The sum of all items has been normalized to one. The major 
changes in the index occurs as of 1993 for Belgium, Ireland; 1994 for Spain, 1995 for the Netherlands; 1996 for 
Finland, 1997 for Italy, Sweden; and 1998 for  Austria, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, 
Luxembourg, and Portugal. 
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Table 3: Hausman Tests for Endogeneity of Macro-economic and Institutional Variables 
 
Variables 
 
 
 
Endogeneity of macro-variables 3.70 20.41 
Endogeneity of macro- and 
institutional variables 
4.50 8.43 
Nobs 167 129 
Country: large ideological distance states small ideological distance states 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. The H0-hypothesis of the Hausman test is 
that the difference in coefficients are not significant. The three macro-economic variables GDP growth, change in 
unemployment and debt servicing costs were instrumentalised using all exogenous variables of the model 
described in model 1 plus lags of the output gap and real GDP growth, lagged changes in unemployment, lagged 
long term interest rates and US GDP and long-term interest rates. The delegation and fiscal targets index where 
instrumentatised using the debt level and institutional setting in 1991. 
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Table 4: The Impact of Budgetary Institutions on Public Debt 
 
Variables 
   
Constant 2.19*** 
(0.57) 
1.86** 
(0.89) 
3.29*** 
(1.15) 
Change in Debt_t-1 0.33*** 
(0.07) 
0.31*** 
(0.07) 
0.28*** 
(0.07) 
Debt_t-1 (Level) -0.02*** 
(0.008) 
-0.02*** 
(0.008) 
-0.02*** 
(0.008) 
Real GDP growth -0.34*** 
(0.11) 
-0.32*** 
(0.12) 
-0.37*** 
(0.13) 
Change in unemployment rate 1.34*** 
(0.26) 
1.09*** 
(0.26) 
1.09*** 
(0.26) 
Debt servicing costs 0.42*** 
(0.17) 
0.44*** 
(0.17) 
0.31* 
(0.16) 
Openness  -0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
Population  -0.0 
(0.0) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Output Volatility  0.36 
(0.23) 
0.30 
(0.23) 
Electoral year 1.13** 
(0.50) 
1.11** 
(0.49) 
1.10** 
(0.47) 
Veto -2.09*** 
(0.85) 
-1.92* 
(1.12) 
-1.45 
(1.13) 
Borrowing restraints for lower 
level of government 
  -0.22 
(0.44) 
Fiscal convergence   -0.12 
(0.18) 
Delegation index   -2.01* 
(1.19) 
Targets index   -0.76 
(0.48) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.58 
 
0.59 
 
0.60 
Wald Statistic 274.82*** 296.22*** 342.08*** 
Nobs 296 296 296 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. The 
targets index is statistically significant at p=0.109. 
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Table 5: The Impact of Budgetary Institutions on Public Debt 
 
Variables 
 
Country groups 
  
Large Ideological Distance 
States 
 
Small Ideological Distance States 
Constant 0.48 
(1.78) 
5.47*** 
(1.43) 
Change in Debt_t-1 0.29*** 
(0.08) 
0.16*** 
(0.07) 
Debt_t-1 (Level) -0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.009) 
Real GDP growth -0.26 
(0.13) 
-0.41*** 
(0.16) 
Change in unemployment rate 1.27*** 
(0.32) 
0.79** 
(0.32) 
Debt servicing costs 0.76*** 
(0.21) 
0.16 
(0.19) 
Openness 0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
Population 0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Output Volatility 0.14 
(0.25) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
Electoral year 0.28 
(0.61) 
2.09*** 
(0.60) 
Veto -0.90 
(2.00) 
1.45 
(2.23) 
Borrowing restraints for lower 
level of government 
-1.99** 
(.72) 
1.08 
(0.70) 
Fiscal convergence 0.20 
(0.22) 
-0.27 
(0.17) 
Delegation index 1.60 
(2.86) 
-2.85** 
(1.46) 
Targets index -1.28** 
(0.64) 
-1.68* 
(0.93) 
 
R-squared 
 
0.71 
 
0.55 
Wald Statistic 274.74*** 443.49*** 
Nobs 160 136 
Note: The dependent variable is the change in gross general government debt as share of GDP. Standard errors are 
shown in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10 (*), 5 (**) and 1 (***) percent level. All 
tests are two-tailed. 
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 Annex 
Table A1: Variables – Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Definition/Code Source 
change in debt Δ gross government debt to GDP ratio 
(in percent) 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
balance general government budget balance European Commission AMECO 
data set 
real GDP growth (in percent)  European Commission AMECO 
data set 
change in unemployment 
rate 
Δ unemployment rate (in percent) European Commission AMECO 
data set 
debt service debt service costs: 
 ( ) 1100 −
−
t
tt Dyr  
where r = real long-term interest rates; y 
= real GDP growth; D =  debt/GDP 
ratio. 
own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
election year Coded as the percent of a year that was 
a pre-electoral year; July 1, for example, 
is .5 this year and .5 the previous year. 
Clark and Hallerberg (2000)   
and Hallerberg (2004), 
supplemented with the country 
studies at   
http://www.economist.com 
veto maximum ideological distance among 
parties based on ideological scores 
along an economic, left-right dimension 
needed for passage of a budget bill. 
Where the government has a majority, 
this corresponds to the coalition parties. 
Where the government is in minority, 
we add the parties that usually 
supported the budget or, where this was 
unknown, the closest parties that would 
result in a majority. Tsebelis did not 
provide information for Greece, while 
his Italian data end in 1994. We 
therefore substitute the manifesto data 
provided in Budge, et al (2001) in the 
regressions for these countries only. 
Given that distances are zero except for 
a few months in 1989-90 for Greece, 
which does not appear in our regression 
for those years because of missing data, 
this is unproblematic. Figures 
standarised to run from 0 to 1. 
Own computation based on 
http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/tsebelis/ 
population (in mill.)   European Commission AMECO 
data set 
openness exports and imports as share of GDP (in 
%) 
Own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
output volatility standard deviation of real GDP growth 
over the past 8 years (t-9 to t-1) 
Own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set 
federal borrowing restriction 1 if restriction exists, 0 otherwise Eichengreen and von Hagen 
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(1995) until 1995, Hallerberg et al. 
(2001) thereafter 
fiscal convergence  (deficit to GDP ratio – 3%) if deficit 
stood above 3% deficit to GDP 
reference value during the period from 
1992 to 1997; 0 otherwise 
Own computation based on 
European Commission AMECO 
data set; the contemporaneous 
deficit value is instrumentalised 
using the past deficit, annual 
dummies and macro-variables 
capturing the international 
environment in year t 
delegation index   Sum of average scores of institutional 
items in the budget formulation, 
approval and implementation stage 
Computations based on data 
presented in Table A2-A4 
targets index Average score of institutional items Computations based on data 
presented in Table A5 
Note: Δ is the first difference operator. 
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Annex: 
The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries 
 
 
Annex I. Specification Issues 
For panel data, typically a fixed or random effects model is estimated to capture the heterogeneity of 
data. In our case, the model (1) would take the following form: 
tititititi Idebtdebt ευγςβα +++Γ+Δ+=Δ − ,,1,,      (A 1) 
For simplicity of exposition, we collect all exogenous non-institutional variables in the matrix Γ. υi 
is the country effect allowing the intercept to vary across countries. An OLS estimator of this model 
would be biased and inconsistent. Since the dependent variable is a function of the fixed effect υI, 
the lagged dependent variable included on the right hand side is correlated with the error term. This 
problem is solved by either using the within-estimator or first differencing the data.22 The within 
estimator is biased and its consistency depends on T, the time dimension, being large.23 For our 
analysis, the length of the sample for the most important specification is relatively small, with T=13, 
which would suggest the use of the second option. The first-differenced model takes the following 
form: 
ttitititi Idebtdebt εγςβ +Δ+ΔΓ+Δ=Δ − ,,1,2,2       (A 2) 
As is immediately evident for the institutional variables, which are our main concern, the 
transformation sets all country observations without any institutional change to zero and therefore 
reduces the sample of non-zero observations to 30 for the delegation and rules indices. Estimates for 
15 EU member states based on this specification would be extremely unreliable. 
                                                     
22  First differencing is common to all dynamic panel estimates. Estimators then differ in how to instrumentalise 
variables and whether a weighting matrix is used to increase the efficiency of the estimate. For an overview of the 
instrumental variable (Anderson-Hsiao) and GMM approaches see Baltagi, B., 2005. Econometric Analysis of Panel 
Data - 3rd Edition. John Wiley & Sons, San Francisco; and S. Bond, 2002. Dynamic panel data models: A Guide to 
Micro Data Methods and Practice. CEMMAP Working Paper CWP09/02, London.  
23  The reason is that the transformed lagged dependent variable iti debtdebt
______
1, Δ−Δ −  is correlated with  iti υυ −, . See 
Baltagi (ibid:125-126) for a more detailed exposition. 
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Annex II. Institutional Data – Coding Scheme and Scores 
 
Table A1: Coding Scheme for Budgetary Institutions 
Budget Negotiations 
general constraint: none (0); balance as share of GDP (1); balance and debt as share of GDP (2);  spending as 
share of GDP or Golden Rule (3); spending and debt as share of GDP (4) 
agenda setting: for budget negotiations: minister of finance or cabinet collects bids from spending ministers 
(0); minister of finance or cabinet collects bids subject to the pre-agreed guidelines (1); cabinet decides on 
budget norms first (2); minister of finance proposes budget norms to be voted on by cabinet (3); minister of 
finance or prime minister determines budget parameters to be observed by spending ministers (4) 
scope of budget norms in the setting of agenda: expenditure or deficit (0); ‘specific’ (1.33), ‘broad’ and 
‘specific’ (2.66), ‘broad’ (4) 
structure of negotiations: all cabinet members involved together (0); multilateral (2); bilateral between 
spending ministers and minister of finance (4) 
Budget Approval 
parliamentary amendments: unlimited (0); limited (4) 
parliamentary amendments required to be off-setting: no (0); yes (4) 
can cause fall of government: no (0); yes (4) 
all expenditures passed in one vote: yes (0); mixed (2); votes are chapter by chapter (4) 
global vote on total budget size: final only (0); initial (4) 
Budget Implementation 
minister of finance can block expenditures: no (0); yes (4) 
spending ministries are subject to cash limits: no (0); yes (4) 
disbursement approval required from minister of finance or controller: no (0); yes (4) 
transfers of expenditures between chapters: unrestricted (0); limited (0.64); requires consent of minister of 
finance (1.28); requires consent minister of parliament (1.92); only within departments possible (2.56); only 
within departments with consent of minister of finance (3.2); not allowed (4) 
changes in the budget law during execution: at discretion of government (0); by new law which is regularly 
submitted during fiscal year (1); at discretion of minister of finance (2); require consent of minister of finance 
and parliament (3); only by new budgetary law to be passed under the same regulations as the ordinary 
budget (4)  
carry-over of unused funds into the next year: unrestricted (0); limited (1.33); limited and requires 
authorization by the minister of finance or parliament (2.66); not possible (4) 
Budget Rules 
multiannual target: none (0); spending or taxation (2); total budget size (4) 
planning horizon (years): two (1); three (2); four (3); five or more (4) 
nature of multi-annual target: ad hoc forecast (1); fixed forecast (2); updated forecasts, but not based on 
consistent macro-model (3); updated on basis of consistent macro-model (4) 
degree of commitment: internal orientation (1); indicative (2); weak political (3); strong political (4) 
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Table A2: Institutions – Executive Planning Stage (1999, 2001/4) 
country Gen_Con91 Gen_Con04 Ag_Set91 Ag_Set04 B_Norm91 B_Norm04 Str_Neg91 Str_Neg04 
AUT 0 4 2 4 0 4 2 2 
BEL 0 4 1 2 0 4 0 2 
DNK 4 4 3 4 1.33 4 4 2 
ESP 0 3 2 4 4 4 0 4 
FIN 1 4 2 2 0 4 2 2 
FRA 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
GBR 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 
GER 3 3 1 2 4 4 4 2 
GRC 0 2 1 4 0 4 0 4 
IRL 2 4 1 4 0 4 0 2 
ITA 2 4 (2) 1 4 2.66 4 2 4 
LUX 3 3 4 4 4 4 0 0 
NLD 1 3 3 2 2.66 4 4 2 
PRT 1 4 2 2 2.66 4 4 2 
SWE 0 3 0 3 1.33 4 4 4 
Note: Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001. Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 
respectively: Gen_Con (general constraint), Ag_Set (agenda setting of minister of finance), B_Norm (budget 
norms), Str_Neg (structure of negotiations) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Institutions – Legislative Approval Stage (1991, 2001/4) 
country 
Am_Lim
91 
Am_Lim
04 
Am_Off
91 
Am_Off
04 
Am_Fall
91 
Am_Fall
04 
Ex_Vote
91 
Ex_Vote
04 
Gl_Vote
91 
Gl_Vote
04 
AUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 
BEL 0 0 (4) 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 
DNK 0 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 
ESP 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
FIN 0 0 0 0 4 4 2 2 0 0 
FRA 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 0 4 4 
GBR 4 4 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
GER 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 2 0 4 
GRC 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 
IRL 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 0 
ITA 4 0 0 4 0 4 2 2 0 4 
LUX 4 4 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 
NLD 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 
PRT 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 1 4 
SWE 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Note: Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001 Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 
respectively: Am_Lim (amendment limitaitons), Am_Off (amendment off-setting), Am_Fall (budget amendment 
can lead to fall of government), Ex_Vote (all expenditures passed in one vote, Gl_Vote (global vote on budget) 
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Table A4: Institutions – Implementation Stage (1991, 2001/4) 
country 
Block_
91 
Block_
04 
CashL
91 
CashL
04 Dis_91 Dis_04 
Tran_ 
91 
Tran_ 
04 
Chan_
91 
Chan_
04 
Carry_
91 
Carry_
04 
AUT 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.2 4 0 0 2.66 2.66 
BEL 0 4 0 0 4 0 2.56 0 4 0 0 0 
DNK 0 4 4 4 0 0 1.92 0 4 3 0 0 
ESP 0 0 0 4 0 0 0.64 1.28 4 0 1 4 
FIN 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 
FRA 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.56 2.4 4 0 1 1.33 
GBR 0 4 4 4 0 4 1.92 1.28 4 4 1 0 
GER 4 4 4 4 4 0 1.28 0.64 3 0 2 2.66 
GRC 4 4 4 4 0 4 1.28 1.28 2 0 3 0 
IRL 0 4 0 0 0 4 3.2 1.28 4 4 3 1.3 
ITA 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 
LUX 4 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 
NLD 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 
1.92 
(2.56) 0 0 1 1.33 
PRT 0 4 4 4 4 0 (4) 0 0 4 2 2 1.3 
SWE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 1.33 2.66 
Note: Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001. Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 
respectively:  Block (minister of finance can block expenditures), CashL (cash limits), Dis (disbursement 
approval), Tran (constraints on transfer allowance), Chan (changes in budget law), Carry (carry-over regulations) 
 
 
Table A5: Institutions – Fiscal Rules (1991, 2001/4) 
country Target_91 Target_04 Horizon_91 Horizon_04 N_Plan_91 N_Plan_04 Commit_91 Commit_04 
AUT 2 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 
BEL 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 
DNK 2 4 2 3 2 4 2 2 
ESP 0 4 4 3 1 4 1 2 
FIN 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
FRA 0 4 1 2 1 4 1 3 
GBR 2 4 4 2 4 4 3 3 
GER 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 
GRC 0 4 2 2 1 4 2 2 
IRL 4 4 4 2 1 4 3 2 
ITA 4 (2) 4 3 3 1 4 3 2 
LUX 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 
NLD 4 4 4 3 2 2 4 4 
PRT 0 4 3 2 1 4 2 4 
SWE 0 4 0 2 1 4 0 4 
Note: Figures represent scores according to the coding scheme presented in Table A2. Values in brackets indicate that 
institutions were modified after 2001. Abbreviations indicate the following items in the years 1991 and 2001 
respectively: Target (type of multi-annual target), Horizon (horizon), N_Plan (nature of plan), Commit (degree of 
commitment) 
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Table A6: Aggregate Delegation and Rules Indices, 1991 and 2001 
 
delegation index 
(1991) 
delegation index  
(2004) 
rules index 
(1991) 
rules index 
(2004) 
AUT 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.8 
BEL 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 
DNK 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8 
ESP 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.8 
FIN 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.9 
FRA 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.8 
GBR 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 
GER 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.9 
GRC 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.8 
IRL 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 
ITA 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.8 
LUX 0.5 0.6 0.0 1.0 
NLD 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.9 
PRT 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.9 
SWE 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.9 
 
 
